Truth stranger than falsehood

At the World Congress of Philosophy everyone at least tries to pretend to take strange beliefs seriously

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• 
• • Julian Baggini
  • guardian.co.uk,
  • Thursday July 31 2008
  • Article history

I'm attending the twice-a-decade thinkathon known as the World Congress of Philosophy and it's turning into a case study of one its own biggest questions:

is there one truth or many?

It is ironic that philosophy – the subject that aspires to describe the most universal and fundamental truths – is probably, as a matter of fact, the least universal discipline of all.

At any global scientific gathering, for example, you could at least be sure that everyone there was doing the same subject. They'd also largely use the same methods and, except at the cutting edge, would agree on a huge body of fact too.

In philosophy, however, what counts as universal is very local. Here in Seoul, the diverse approaches on display at the conference range from Jainism, Buddhism and Confucianism, through to Hegelian dialectics, hermeneutics and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Although all are welcome into the philosophy family for the congress, it is not clear that what they mean by philosophy is the same thing at all.

However,

dialogue is de rigeur and everyone does their best to at least pretend to treat all the different forms of philosophy equally. But this is politics, not philosophy.

For instance, I've just been to a session by an organisation called Jain Vishva Bharati, in which 10 people lined up to describe "The Role of Jainism in Evolving a New Paradigm of Philosophy". To put it diplomatically, this is not a new paradigm that is likely to find many adherents at present. For instance. one speaker evoked the experiments of Masaru Emoto, an amateur scientist who claimed to show that if you spoke ugly or beautiful words to droplets of water, froze them, and then took microscopic photographs of them, the images would be ugly and beautiful accordingly. I hope I don't need to tell you whether his views are widely shared in the scientific community.

However, the chair of the session called on the incoming president of FISP (The International Federation of Philosophical Societies) William McBride to join the panel and give his blessing, and of course, this he had to do, saying how much he agreed with many of their objectives, such as world peace.

They then called on former president Ioanna Kuçuradi to do the same. Only the day before she had spoken about the need to resist relativism and insist knowledge has an object. The Jainists, however, had explicitly denied the "binary system of logic" which "maintains that if something is true it cannot be false." "This is not acceptable to the Jain point of view," said Prof SR Bhatt, although presumably he would allow that it was acceptable too.

Kuçuradi couldn't be as fulsome in her support as McBride was, and she had the honesty to admit that although she valued different world views, philosophy is not a world view, implying she could not endorse what was being said as philosophy.

Kuçuradi managed to make a distinction that many miss. It is one thing to accept people's right to hold different views and to be against the imposition of one world view on another. But it is quite another to insist that this requires holding that there is no one truth, or that reality is just what you think it is.

It is vital we follow Kuçuradi's lead and

don't allow a desire to respect others to lead us to believe, or pretend to believe, that we agree more than we do. Much interfaith and intercultural dialogue has so far been so much hot air, because the desire not to offend has interfered with the need to be honest about what divides us.

As to whether the misguided desire or the required need is prevailing in Seoul, so far I fear the lesser virtue is prevailing.

what's the difference between a Philosopher and a PhD?

A philosopher learns less and less about more and more until they know nothing about everything.

A PhD learns more and more about less and less until they know everything about nothing.

--
So what about PhDs in Philosophy?

source: www.nuclearphynance.com pg 3 by Heptane via Reasonable Deviations. Posted also on PhiloGym.

Ten Commandments of Philosophy

reposted from Introduction to Philosophy, "What is Philosophy" by Louis P Pojman (2008, 4th ed, pg 7). I quote the text unedited:-

1. Allow the Spirit of wonder to flourish in your heart. Philosophy begins with deep wonder about the universe, about who we are, where we come from, and where we are going. What is this life all about? Speculate and explore different points of view and worldviews. Do not stifle childlike curiosity.
2. Doubt everything unsupported by evidence until the evidence convinces you of its truth. Be reasonably cautious, a moderate skeptic, suspicious of those who claim to have the truth. Doubt is the souls purgative. Do not fear intellectual inquiry. As Goethe said the masses fear the intellectual, but it is stupidity they should fear, if they only realised how dangerous it really is.
3. Love the Truth. "Philosophy is the eternal search for truth, a search which inevitably fails and yet is never defeated; which continually eludes us, but which always guides us. This free, intellectual life of the mind is the noblest inheritance of the Western World; it is also the hope of our future." (W. T. Jones)
4. Divide and Conquer. Divide each problem and theory into its smallest essential components in order to analyze each unit carefully. This is the analytic method.
5. Collect and Construct. Build a coherent argument or theory from component parts. One should move from the simple, secure foundations to the complex and comprehensive in the manner of Bertrand Russell that we mentioned earlier. The important thing is to have a coherent , well founded, tightly reasoned set of beliefs that can withstand the opposition.
6. Conjecture and Refute. Make a complete survey of possible objections to your position, looking for counter-examples and subtle mistakes. Following a suggestion of Karl Popper, philosophy is a system of conjecture and refutation. Seek bold hypotheses and seek disconformations of your favourite positions. In this way, by a process of elimination, you will negatively, indirectly and gradually approach the Truth.
7. Revise and Rebuild. Be willing to revise, reject, and modify your beliefs and the degree with which your hold any belief. Acknowledge that you probably have many false beliefs and be grateful to those who correct you. This is the principle of fallibilism, the thesis that we are very likely incorrect in many of our beliefs and have a tendency towards self-deception when considering objections to our position.
8. Seek Simplicity. This is the principle of parsimony, also known as "Occam's Razor". Prefer the simpler explanation to the more complex, all things being equal. Of course, all things are not always equal. Sometimes the truth is complex, but where to explanations are of relatively equal merit, prefer the simpler.
9. Live the Truth. Appropriate your ideas in a personal way, so that even as the Objective Truth is a correspondence of the thought to the world, this Lived Truth will be a correspondance of the life to the thought. As Kierkegaard said, "Here is a definition of [subjective] truth: holding fast to an objective uncertainty in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth available for an existing individual."
10. Live the Good! Let the practical conclusions of a philosophical reflection on the moral life inspire and motivate you to action. Let moral truth transform your life so that you shine like a jewel in its own light amid the darkness of ignorance.

Philosophy? A Luxury by Giovanni De Grandis

Philosophy? A Luxury by Giovanni De Grandis - Friday, 1 February 2008, 02:27 PM

Stephen Law advocates philosophy arguing that it is useful and benefits society.
In some postings I have read some second thoughts about that.
But do we really need to defend philosophy appealing to its usefulness?
At a certain point in my life I got tired of being asked by people 'what are you going to do with philosophy?', or 'what's the use of philosophy?'. So I began to answer that philosophy is a luxury. It has no particular use, but its beautiful and enjoyable.
Do we need to justify our willingness to play games, contemplate beauty, fall in love? No, we don't. So why should we justify philosophy?
It is a little treat that makes our life richer.

Was I wrong in adopting this strategy?

Is philosophy a waste of time? Should it aim to offer practical advice and consoling thoughts OR aim at Truth (whether consoling or not)?

reposted from: http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2007/11/alain-de-botton.html
Chris Street comments are in bright green; highlights in blockquotes (yellow).

Picture of Alain de Botton.

This seems like a minor spat between philosophers de Botton and Law. Does de Botton claim that philosophy does NOT aim for the truth? Is the best way of getting at the truth - through science, not philosophy?

Saturday, November 17, 2007

Alain de Botton interview on Philosophy Bites

Hear Alain de Botton defending himself against his philosophical critics - e.g. critics like me - here.

For Stepen Law's critical review (in 2000) of The Consolations of Philosophy in the Mail on Sunday go here.

Note that, towards the end of the interview, Alain suggests that the kind of analytic philosophy I and other professional mainstream academic philosophers do (when I publish in journals) is, in fact, a waste of time. Only the sort of thing he does (the more "literary" stuff) is worthwhile.

He also suggests that in the book.

But then he says near the beginning of the interview that he was surprised when academics took him to task. He says:

I was quite surprised. I quickly became aware that I had done a very bad thing, but it was unclear to me for a while what that bad thing is supposed to be.

[Incidentally, I don't think it unclear what my objection is - but make up your own mind about that.]

The problem many academics have with Alain's book and his subsequent remarks is that he rubbished what they do, did so on a very intellectually flimsy basis, then said he was "surprised" at the response, putting it down (in this interview) to "the narcissism of small differences" (i.e. their narcissism) and adding "we should all have been friends and, basically, been on the same side."

Well I am very happy to be friends, but I am afraid that,

on the issue of what philosophy should aim at, we're not on the same side. Alain says it should aim at dispensing practical advice and consoling thoughts. I think philosophy should aim at truth, whether the truth be consoling or not.

Indeed, in the book,

Alain seems pretty uninterested in whether what e.g. Seneca or Socrates have to say is actually true just so long as it makes life seem more bearable. It doesn't seem to matter to Alain that some of the philosophical theories he presents actually contradict each other. Philosophy is simply a medicine cabinet offering us a range of therapeutic and consoling thoughts - a little Seneca for your frustration, some Epicurus for your money worries, and so on.

I have

I actually think that dispensing agony-aunt style wisdom is something philosophers do very badly. I'd leave that business to Miriam Stoppard and Claire Rayner.

Rarely does even the best practical philosophy console us. Usually, it gives us a hefty and deeply uncomfortable kick up the pants (e.g. Peter Singer).

Of course, I do agree there's no harm in trying to make philosophy accessible and immediately relevant to day-to-day life where possible. But sometimes some of the very best philosophy is neither. That doesn't make it a waste of time.

Tim Crane on Mind and Body

reposted from: http://philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=261525#

Tim Crane on Mind and Body

What is the mind and how does it relate to our bodies? How can something physical think? These are fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind. Tim Crane addresses these difficult issues in this interview for Philosophy Bites.

Direct download: CraneMixSess.MP3

Brad Hooker on Consequentialism

reposted from PhilosophyBites

Brad Hooker on Consequentialism

What makes an action a good one? According to consequentialists this question is decided by the action's actual or likely consequences. In this episode of Philosophy Bites the moral philosopher Brad Hooker explains what consequentialism is and defends it against possible criticism.

Direct download: Hooker1MixSess.MP3

PASCAL’S WAGER - there are no rational grounds available to settle whether the Christian faith is true or false.

reposted from Stephen Law

PASCAL’S WAGER

[taken from my forthcoming book for Quercus, Greatest Philosophers, out next month (and which, in my opinion, is a bargain at under £6 for a 200+ page, larger format, illustrated book. In fact I'm not sure it isn't too cheap.)]


According to Pascal, there are no rational grounds available to settle whether the Christian faith is true or false. Reason cannot settle the matter one way or the other. So should we believe, or not?

Pascal suggests we approach this question as if it involved placing a bet. We have two options: we can believe, or we can fail to believe. What do we stand to win or lose in each case?

Well, if I believe, and there is a God, then I win big. My reward will be eternal happiness. But what if there is no God? Then obviously I won’t receive that fantastic reward. But still, my loss is not so very great. Little more than those Sunday mornings I had to spend in church.

If, on the other hand, I fail to believe in God, and God exists, I lose big, for I face eternal damnation. Nothing could be worse. And if I fail to believe in God, and there is no God, then I win, but then I don’t win very much. Not much more, in fact, than those free Sunday mornings.

We can display these outcomes in a table, like so:

-------------------------------God exists-------------God does not exist

Believe in God-------------eternal bliss-----------small loss of worldly pleasures

Fail to believe in God-----eternal damnation---small gain in worldly pleasures

Now, assuming that we have no more grounds to suppose God does exist than to suppose he doesn’t, surely the rational bet to make is to believe in God. If I believe, then I will either win big or lose a little. If I fail to believe, then I either win small or lose big. Belief is therefore the more sensible wager, concludes Pascal.

Pascal claims belief in God is the rational choice even though there are no more grounds for supposing the belief is true than there are for supposing it is false. His claim sounds paradoxical, but, correctly understood, it is not. Consider an analogous case. You are diagnosed with a disease that will certainly soon kill you unless you receive treatment. There is only one treatment, and it has a 50% success rate. When the treatment doesn’t work, its side-effects are rather unpleasant. What should you do?

Clearly, the rational choice, assuming you want to live, is to undergo the treatment, despite the fact that you have no more grounds to suppose it will work than you have to suppose it won’t. Undergo the treatment and you will either win big or lose little. Fail to undergo the treatment, and you will either lose big or win small.

If Pascal is correct, the option of believing in God is similarly one it would be irrational not to embrace.

Objections to Pascal’s argument

Many have found Pascal’s argument persuasive, but it does run up against some well-known objections, including the following:

1.

We cannot choose what we believe.

First, some will respond, “But I can’t just choose to believe that God exists. It may be that, though I can see that belief in God is the rational bet, and so would very much like to believe it, I can’t manage it. Try as I might, belief eludes me.” Pascal acknowledges that we can’t usually choose what we believe. Certainly we can’t just make ourselves believe something directly, by a sheer act of will. However, he notes that even those who merely start off by going through the motions of religious belief often end up true believers. So if I also make myself go though the motions – if I regularly go to church and pray – I am likely to end up a true believer. This is exactly what Pascal recommends I should do.

2. Pascal’s wager is based on a dubious assumption.

Pascal supposes that the arguments and evidence for and against God’s existence are evenly balanced. But are they? Most atheists would deny this. Many would say the arguments and the evidence overwhelming support the claim that there is no God. If they are right about that – if, say, the odds of God existing are not 50-50, but more than 99-1 against – then it is not quite so obvious that belief in God is the rational bet.

To illustrate, let’s return to the medical example outlined above. If you are told the probability that the treatment will succeed is not 50%, but much less than one percent, then it is not so clear that the rational choice is to opt for treatment. Especially as you know that you will almost certainly experience some nasty side-effects as a result. Under these circumstances, you might well calculate that you would be better off rejecting treatment.

3. Another dubious assumption.

Third, we might question whether Pascal is right to assume all believers will be rewarded with eternal bliss and all disbelievers with eternal damnation.

If I was God, I wouldn’t be particularly impressed by someone who believed in me purely on the basis of a self-interested calculation. Nor, if I had deliberately arranged the evidence for my existence to be equivocal, would I condemn to eternal agony someone who then failed to believe in me. Such punishment seems rather harsh, particularly from a God who is supposed to be supremely benevolent.

So Pascal’s estimation of how God, if he exists, will react to our belief or disbelief – that he will reward all believers with limitless bliss and punish all unbelievers with an eternity of hellfire – is certainly open to question.

Does philosophy progress? by AC Grayling

reposted from Prospect Magazine May 2007

Does philosophy progress?

Ever since its origin in antiquity, "philosophy" has meant "enquiry." Its central concern is enquiry into the two most fundamental questions facing humankind: what is the nature of the world, and which of the things that exist and happen in it really matter?

Each question comprises sub-questions. The first asks what exists, what it consists of, and how we can know either accurately. The second asks what is valuable, ethically and aesthetically, and how we decide. All the law and prophets—to coin a phrase—is summed up here.

From this, one can see that philosophy does indeed progress. In classical antiquity itself, it was a giant step forward to begin thinking systematically about the organisation of society and forms of political authority, and to examine the assumptions of ideas about moral conduct. In the process, the ancient philosophers articulated the first canons of logic and theories of knowledge, and advanced the first tentative scientific theories about the structure and properties of matter, the nature of the universe and human psychology, as well as the first rational critiques of superstition.

The philosophical quest was all but suspended in Europe for more than a thousand years of religious hegemony over thought. It revived in the Renaissance, one of whose corollaries, the Reformation, broke the hold of ecclesiastical authority over what could count as permissible enquiry.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, philosophy gave birth to the natural sciences by finding fruitful ways of asking questions about the nature of the world. In the 18th century it gave birth to psychology, in the 19th to sociology and empirical linguistics, and in the 20th to artificial intelligence and cognitive science.

At the same time, every generation has to re-examine the questions of how to organise itself politically and comport itself morally.

The duty to reflect—to challenge assumptions, to remain vigilant against the forces that seek to erode the gains humankind makes in the direction of liberty and rights—is perennial.

The questions remain insistent for the obvious reasons that new conditions arise, new forms of old difficulties appear, and the analogue of the entropic force that ceaselessly works to make things fall apart in nature infects human arrangements even more deeply.

One of the most progressive things about philosophy, therefore, in addition to the progress it has generated in these ways, is its effort to defend its progress in the face of the tireless endeavour of power and superstition to drag mankind back to a pre-philosophical infantilism, in which people are commanded to believe and behave as instructed.

Sent in by Harriet Roberts, Chiswick.

Send your philosophical queries and dilemmas to AC Grayling at question@prospect-magazine.co.uk

Why is there something rather than nothing?

reposted from Prospect Magazine June 2007


Why is there something rather than nothing?

Some philosophers think this question is genuinely puzzling on the grounds that nothingness is vastly simpler than somethingness, and might rationally be supposed the more "natural" state in view of the presumably infinite effort required for anything to emerge from nothing. And yet there is something, so, they wish to know why.

Others ask why there is something rather than nothing because they expect, or at least desire, an answer incorporating the claim that the universe exists for a purpose, which the answer accordingly identifies.

The vacuous hypothesis that there is something because it was created by a supernatural agency can be dismissed.

The hypothesis in effect says that the reason there is anything at all is that something else made it, which is either question-begging or invites an explanatorily null regress. It is one of the most persistently lingering human fatuities that the origins of the universe (or indeed anything else) can be explained by arbitrarily invoking an entity equally arbitrarily defined as fully equipped to be the explanation of what is to be explained. Dismissal of such a theistic pseudo-answer terminates hopes of any answer couched in terms of purpose.

A second and better answer is to point out that the question is unanswerable. This is not the same as saying that it is pointless—though it is, given the brute fact that there is indeed something, and that the really interesting questions relate to what exactly that something is, and what if anything in it is valuable from the perspective of conscious experience. Nor is it unanswerable because we are not the kind of creature capable of finding or understanding the answer, as some (defeatists, surely) claim about the puzzle of consciousness.

Rather, it is unanswerable because it is radically unlike questions that, like "Why do elephants have trunks?" validly prompt an expectation of informative answers. "Why does anything exist?" does not do so because it is like "What colour are ideas?"—it makes a category mistake. For "nothing" denotes privation or absence relative to something, not a state or condition existentially on a par with somethingness. When all the chocolates are eaten, there is nothing in the box because there was something there before; you cannot introduce nothing ("nothingness"?) to a box other than by not putting something in it, or by taking everything out. So the primitive condition is that there is something, and we only understand "nothing" relatively and locally by its absence.

It is quite something to say that there is nothing more to the problem than something like that: but nothing, I submit, is a better answer.

Sent in by Julian Dare, Oxford

Edward Craig - What is Philosophy?

source: Edward Craig - What is Philosophy?

Edward Craig, editor of the Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy and author of Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction gives an interesting angle on the nature of philosophy, how it relates to other kinds of thinking, and what makes good philosophy good.

Direct download: CraigPhil.MP3